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H E R B E RT H O V E N K A M P

& CARL SHAPIRO

Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens
of Proof
abstract. Since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 decision in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, antitrust challengers have mounted prima facie cases against horizontal mergers
that rest on the level and increase in market concentration caused by the merger. Proponents of
the merger are then permitted to rebut by providing evidence that the merger will not have the
feared anticompetitive effects. Although the means of measuring that concentration as well as the
triggering levels have changed over the last half century, this basic approach has remained intact.
This longstanding structural presumption has been critical to effective merger enforcement. In this
Feature, we argue that the structural presumption is strongly supported by economic theory and
evidence and suggest some ways to further strengthen it. We also respond to those who would
weaken or eliminate it. Our analysis applies to the modern legal landscape, where the promotion
of competition and the protection of consumer welfare are considered the purpose of merger enforcement.
We also consider a promising recent legislative proposal that aims to strengthen and expand
the structural presumption. In particular, we suggest that the proposal can be improved so as to
strengthen merger enforcement, primarily by facilitating the government’s establishment of its
prima facie case, while staying true to the fundamental goal of antitrust to promote competition.
authors. Herbert Hovenkamp is the James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and
Wharton Business, University of Pennsylvania. Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley. We thank participants
at the “Unlocking the Promise of Antitrust Enforcement” conference at American University, as
well as the editors of the Yale Law Journal, for valuable input on an earlier draft. No party other
than UC Berkeley provided any ﬁnancial support to Shapiro for this Feature.
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introduction
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark merger decision in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,1 challengers have mounted prima facie cases against horizontal mergers that rest on the level and increase in market concentration caused
by the merger. For example, in the Heinz baby food case, the D.C. Circuit enjoined a merger of two manufacturers who each had more than 15% of the market and were the second- and third- largest competitors in the industry.2 The
merger would have doubled the size of the second largest ﬁrm and created a
market dominated by just two ﬁrms, one with a 65% market share and the other
with more than 30%. Those facts about both the increase in concentration that
the merger produced and the resulting overall concentration were sufficient for
prima facie illegality. When such a prima facie case has been made, the merging
parties can then rebut this structural presumption by showing that the market
shares do not accurately predict competitive effects. Generally, they do this by
making one of three showings: ﬁrst, that the proposed market is poorly deﬁned
or that market shares exaggerate the merger’s anticompetitive potential; 3 second, that entry into the market will discipline any price increase;4 or third, that
the merger produces offsetting efficiencies sufficient to keep prices at premerger
levels or otherwise counteract any anticompetitive effects.5
This Philadelphia National Bank burden-shifting approach has been critical
for effective horizontal merger enforcement by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). While the technical analysis of markets and the size of the relevant numbers have shifted somewhat over time, the
basic structural presumption and burden-shifting framework remain alive and
well.6 We strongly support the application of the structural presumption in merger cases and suggest in this Feature how to broaden the set of situations in
which the presumption operates.
Our approach is highly pragmatic: given that horizontal merger enforcement
is typically a predictive exercise that is conducted after mergers are proposed but
before they are consummated, what facts can the government realistically establish in court? We argue that considerable uncertainty is the norm, as to both the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

374 U.S. 321 (1963).
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 711-12, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 941 (4th ed. 2016).
4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 970-76 (4th ed. 2016).
For a robust defense of the use of presumptions in merger analysis, see Steven C. Salop, The
Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J.
269, 276-78 (2015).
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likely competitive effects of the merger and the speciﬁc manner in which those
effects will manifest in the market. We thus embrace the structural presumption
for very practical reasons, notwithstanding certain valid criticisms regarding
market deﬁnition. Ultimately, we argue that market shares are often highly informative, despite the fact that one can measure market shares only after the
messy process of deﬁning the relevant market. In addition, the structural presumption is rebuttable.
Two important economic ideas underlie the structural presumption. First,
the loss of a signiﬁcant competitor in a concentrated market will likely enhance
market power. Second, signiﬁcant entry barriers often exist in concentrated markets. The Chicago School and other critics have challenged both of these economic ideas over the past half century.7 These fundamental principles remain
valid as bases for the burden-shifting approach of the structural presumption.
Both ideas ﬁnd strong support in how companies themselves formulate and execute competitive strategy—and indeed in how they evaluate proposed mergers
and select merger partners. In contrast, the Chicago School’s views that small
ﬁrms are just as effective competitors as large ﬁrms and that entry will typically
and promptly occur in response to prices modestly above competitive levels ﬁnd
much less empirical support. Importantly, if those conditions do apply in particular markets, the structural presumption can be rebutted with industry-speciﬁc
evidence.
Our response to those who criticize the structural presumption because of its
reliance on market deﬁnition is threefold. First, we suggest that the courts,
whenever practical, should assess whether the market shares that underlie the
government’s structural presumption are sensitive to the precise boundaries of
the relevant market. If not, then many of the criticisms based on market deﬁnition melt away, and the structural presumption deserves greater weight. If the
market shares are sensitive to market deﬁnition, then the court should ask which
set of market shares more accurately reﬂects the likely competitive effects of the
proposed merger for the overlap products. Direct evidence of the likely competitive effects, such as the extent of direct competition between the merging parties, will be important for this purpose. However, the fact that the market shares

7.

E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 221 (1978)
(largely denying the existence of any relationship between market structure and competitive
performance, provided that the market contains at least two ﬁrms); id. at 310-29 (largely
denying the existence of entry barriers, with the exception of competitive prices). On other
members of the Chicago School who shared these views, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever
Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement? (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research
Paper No. 18-7, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3097452 [http://perma.cc/MG7X
-62W5].
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vary with the boundaries of the market does not make those shares uninformative or require the abandonment of market deﬁnition altogether.
Second, the government should be entitled to the structural presumption if
the merger causes the requisite increase in concentration in any properly deﬁned
relevant market. Even if the defense can identify an alternative relevant market
(whether broader or narrower) in which the level or increase in concentration is
insufficient to trigger the structural presumption, that showing does not negate
or rebut the presumption. This observation is especially important because the
accepted method of deﬁning relevant markets in horizontal merger cases, namely
the hypothetical monopoly test (HMT), generally leads to relatively narrow
markets.8 Under the HMT, a group of products is tested as a “candidate market”
to determine whether it qualiﬁes as a relevant antitrust market. Any candidate
market for which the court concludes that a perfectly functioning cartel would
lead to a signiﬁcant price increase qualiﬁes as a relevant market. The objection
that the merger leads to only a modest increase in concentration in some broader
market is not responsive, so long as the market identiﬁed by the challenger satisﬁes the HMT. As we note below, this is particularly pertinent in unilateral effects analysis.9
Third, we argue that in some cases the government should be able to prevail
without invoking the structural presumption, at least as commonly stated, based
on a more direct showing of the likely competitive effects of the proposed merger. As a result, market deﬁnition need not always be a gating factor for the government. This is especially true in cases where it is unclear which relevant market
would be the most informative regarding the merger’s likely competitive effects.
Allowing this route for the government would harmonize horizontal merger law
with other areas of antitrust law, where the courts have shown an increasing willingness to look at direct evidence of the likely effect of challenged conduct, relying
less on indirect evidence based on a ﬁrm’s market share. 10 We also consider
brieﬂy whether the existing statutory language permits an approach that avoids
market deﬁnition altogether.11
We also discuss how the courts should evaluate evidence of market structure
alongside more direct evidence of likely competitive effects. In cases in which the

8.

See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE 12
n.42 (Feb. 2008), http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/fa95/8d2f5b986c8108b98724da53a6e5df6
9c18c.pdf [http://perma.cc/RG7L-W65Z].
9. See infra Part III.
10. E.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (permitting market power to be inferred
from a large exclusion payment).
11. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
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government alleges effects arising solely due to the loss of direct competition
between the two merging ﬁrms, so-called “unilateral effects,” alternative metrics
such as diversion ratios or upward pricing pressure can complement and supplement the more traditional measures of market shares and the HerﬁndahlHirschman Index (HHI) without necessarily displacing them. 12 In cases in
which the government alleges coordinated effects, the role of market deﬁnition
and concentration measures such as the HHI is much more fundamental.
Part I explains that considerable economic evidence supports the proposition
that a merger combining two ﬁrms with substantial market shares in a concentrated market is likely to reduce competition and harm customers. This evidence
has strengthened over the past ten to twenty years, as economies of scale have
become more signiﬁcant in many industries. This shift, primarily driven by technological change, further strengthens the economic basis for the structural presumption, because ﬁrms with small market shares and new entrants are less
likely to be as effectively competitive as ﬁrms that have proven their capabilities
by achieving a substantial market share. Part II argues that the structural presumption is deeply established in the case law and has been a central element of
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines for a full ﬁfty years. Part II further explains
how the DOJ and the FTC can use the structural presumption more aggressively
under existing case law. We also respond to those who would weaken or eliminate the structural presumption. Part III discusses how the structural presumption can most effectively be applied in cases where loss of direct competition between the merging ﬁrms, i.e., with unilateral effects, is the primary concern.13
Part IV relates the structural presumption to the fundamental goal of antitrust law and policy. The structural presumption and the associated burdenshifting framework, as they have developed over the past ﬁfty years, rely on the
assumption that the goal of merger policy is to promote “consumer welfare” by
protecting consumers against high prices or reduced output, product variety,
product quality, or innovation. Our analysis in Parts I, II, and III assumes that
the goal of merger enforcement policy is to promote consumer welfare. As we
use this term, applying the “consumer welfare” standard means that a merger is
12.

The HHI is a widely used index of market concentration, measured as the sum of the squares
of the market shares of all ﬁrms in the market. On the use of diversion ratios and upward
pricing pressure in merger analysis based on unilateral effects, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 712-33
(2010).
13. As distinct from unilateral effects, “coordinated effects” involve harm to competition arising
from coordination between the merged ﬁrm and its remaining rivals. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 20-27, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/VWP7-JQRM] [hereinafter
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES].
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judged to be anticompetitive if it disrupts the competitive process and harms
trading parties on the other side of the market.14 If the goal were something else,
such as deterring industrial concentration to control corporate political power or
protecting small ﬁrms from larger competitors, then the structural presumption
would be viewed differently or might not apply at all.
Finally, in Part V, we brieﬂy consider a legislative proposal that aims to
strengthen and expand the structural presumption. We offer some guidance concerning how this proposal could be improved so as to strengthen merger enforcement, in part by making it easier for the government to establish its prima
facie case.
i. the economic case for the structural presumption
The structural presumption is rooted in empirical evidence indicating that
more concentrated markets tend to have higher prices and higher price-cost margins, all else equal. During the 1970s and 1980s, that evidence came to be seen
as less convincing, leading to a weakening of the structural presumption. Nonetheless, the economic case for the structural presumption remains strong, and
the most recent economic evidence supports a strengthening of the presumption.
The empirical origins of the structural presumption can be traced back to the
1950s. Building on the work of Joe S. Bain, industrial organization economists
began to devote considerable attention to the empirical relationship between various measures of market structure and market performance.15 The resulting literature of interindustry studies found that more concentrated industries tended
to perform poorly in serving consumers, displaying higher prices, higher pricecost margins, and higher proﬁts than less concentrated industries.16

14.

These trading parties may be ﬁnal consumers or businesses purchasing intermediate goods.
They also may be suppliers such as workers or farmers who are harmed by the loss of competition when two large buyers merge. See Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 18-8, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3124483 [http://perma.cc/9GFV-9MSB]. For
further discussion of the meaning and interpretation of the consumer welfare standard,
see Carl Shapiro, The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated, or a Harbor in a
Sea of Doubt?, HAAS SCH. BUS. (Dec. 13, 2017), http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro
/consumerwelfarestandard.pdf [http://perma.cc/E3EZ-K6TW].
15. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956). Prior to Bain’s work, most empirical research in industrial organization involved case studies of speciﬁc industries.
16. Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); see also
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These research results greatly inﬂuenced legal thinking about antitrust during the 1960s. For example, in his important 1960 article on mergers, Derek Bok
observed that “lawyers have . . . learned that, within a market, changes in the
number and relative size of ﬁrms are among the most important determinants
of competition and monopoly.”17 In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
decided in 1963, the Supreme Court similarly concluded that the principle that
“[c]ompetition is likely to be greatest when there are many sellers, none of which
has any signiﬁcant market share,” was “common ground among most economists, and was undoubtedly a premise of congressional reasoning about the antimerger statute.”18
The additional cases of Brown Shoe19 and Von’s Grocery,20 as well as the 1968
Merger Guidelines,21 represented the high-water marks for merger enforcement
based on measures of market concentration. In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court,
relying heavily on its view that Congress intended to halt consolidation in its
incipiency, stated, “If a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we
might be required to approve future merger efforts by Brown’s competitors seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then
be furthered and it would be difficult to dissolve the combinations previously
approved.”22
Likewise, in Von’s Grocery, the Court enjoined a merger between two grocery
retailers with a combined share of 7.5% in the Los Angeles market. 23 Noting
these shares and the many acquisitions that had taken place in that market, the
Court found the merger violated Section 7.24 Reﬂecting these decisions by the
Court, the 1968 Merger Guidelines placed great emphasis on the overall “[m]arket structure” as the “focus” of the DOJ’s query.25 Those Guidelines identiﬁed
Leonard W. Weiss, The Concentration-Proﬁts Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 184, 184-233 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 226, 238 (1960).
374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (footnote omitted) (quoting Comment, “Substantially To Lessen Competition . . . ”: Current Problems of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1638-39 (1959)).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2015) [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [http://
perma.cc/49M6-M8JU].
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 343-44.
Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. at 272.
Id.
1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 1.
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two overall market concentration levels and merging ﬁrm market shares that
would “ordinarily” trigger a challenge.26 In “highly concentrated” markets, those
with a four-ﬁrm concentration ratio (CR4) exceeding 75%, the DOJ would challenge a merger if each ﬁrm had a premerger market share exceeding 4%.27 For a
ﬁrm with a share of 10%, the government would challenge the acquisition of a
ﬁrm with a share of at least 2%.28 In less highly concentrated markets, the DOJ
would challenge a merger if each ﬁrm had a premerger market share exceeding
5%; if the acquiring ﬁrm’s share was 10%, the government would challenge the
acquisition of a ﬁrm with a share of at least 4%. 29 Further, the 1968 Merger
Guidelines followed Brown Shoe in applying harsher scrutiny if the market had
exhibited a “trend toward increased concentration.”30
In 1982, the Merger Guidelines were updated to apply a dramatically less
strict structural presumption than that found in the 1968 Merger Guidelines.
The 1982 Merger Guidelines considered markets unconcentrated if the HHI was
below 1,000, moderately concentrated if the HHI was between 1,000 and 1,800,
and highly concentrated if the HHI was above 1,800.31 They stated that the government was “likely to challenge mergers” that raised the HHI by at least 100
points and led to a postmerger HHI of more than 1,800.32 The 10% plus 4%
merger that would have triggered a challenge under the 1968 Merger Guidelines
would cause the HHI to rise by only eighty points and thus would not create a
presumption under the 1982 Merger Guidelines, regardless of the shares of the
other ﬁrms.
During the 2010 update of the Guidelines, the set of mergers that trigger the
structural presumption was reduced further to reﬂect actual agency practice.
These Guidelines deﬁne markets to be highly concentrated if the HHI is greater

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7. The idea of increased scrutiny in antitrust cases where the industry in question had
exhibited a trend toward concentration ﬁrst appeared in an exclusive dealing decision. See
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 n.1 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
It migrated to merger law in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332-34 (1962),
which identiﬁed the concern in the legislative history of the 1950 amendments to Section 7.
See also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966); United States v. Phila.
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 325, 331, 363 (1963).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES 13 (2015) [hereinafter 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11248.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6EG3-Y3TL].
Id. at 14-15.
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than 2,500, and then apply the following structural presumption: “Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of
more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”33
For example, in a market with ﬁve 20% ﬁrms, a merger between two of those
ﬁrms would raise the HHI from 2,000 to 2,800, triggering the presumption.
However, in a market with four 20% ﬁrms and two 10% ﬁrms, a merger between
a 20% ﬁrm and a 10% ﬁrm would not trigger the presumption: the HHI would
increase from 1,800 to 2,200, so the postmerger market would be only moderately concentrated. Following the Guidelines, such a merger might “warrant
scrutiny,” but it would not be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.34
What explains these revisions to the structural presumption in the Guidelines? A major explanation is changes in economic thinking over the last ﬁfty
years. Steven Salop argues that “this evolution to a weaker presumption based
on market shares and concentration is consistent with and was likely caused by
the parallel evolution of economic analysis.”35 In particular, many scholars questioned the quality of the data and the econometric methods used by the interindustry studies that demonstrated a relationship between concentration and profits.36 The relationship between concentration and proﬁtability was shown to be
statistically weak and unstable over time.37
However, important ﬁndings relating market structure to performance remain valid. In particular, the empirical evidence shows a positive relationship
between seller concentration and prices or price-cost margins. On this point,
Richard Schmalensee reported that “[i]n cross-section comparisons involving
markets in the same industry, seller concentration is positively related to the level
of price.” 38 Such intraindustry comparisons are especially relevant for merger
control policy and are often used in merger analysis.39 Michael Salinger reached
the same conclusion as Schmalensee in his own review of the evidence on the
relationship between market concentration and price-cost margins, stating, “the
inappropriate inferences used to justify an active antitrust policy have given way

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 19.
See id.
Salop, supra note 6, at 276.
See generally Weiss, supra note 16, at 184-233.
Schmalensee, supra note 16, at 976.
Id. at 988.
For a leading example from twenty years ago and an analysis, see FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); and Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 11 (1999) (analyzing the motivation and methods behind the
FTC’s econometric analyses of pricing).
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to equally incorrect inferences that have been used to justify a relaxed merger
policy.”40
Economic thinking has also greatly evolved over the past ﬁfty years regarding
the interpretation of the empirical evidence relating market concentration to various measures of market performance. Two key points from this literature bear
emphasis.
First, since at least the 1970s, antitrust economists have recognized that in
markets where there are substantial economies of scale, the process of competition often leads quite naturally to high levels of concentration.41 In such markets,
the most efficient ﬁrms typically incur large ﬁxed costs, including research and
development (R&D) costs. In the long run, these ﬁrms will make the necessary
investments only if they anticipate that future price-cost margins will be sufficiently large to allow them to earn an acceptable risk-adjusted rate of return.
Thus, observing high levels of concentration and high price-cost margins does
not, in and of itself, indicate any failure of the competitive process. Indeed, such
a pattern is to be expected in industries where ﬁrms regularly make large R&D
investments or incur other large ﬁxed costs.
Second, quite apart from economies of scale, the process of competition can
and often does cause a few ﬁrms to have large market shares if they are simply
more efficient than their rivals.42 Thus, observing a few ﬁrms growing, and even
driving smaller or less efficient ﬁrms out of business, also does not, in and of
itself, indicate any failure of the competitive process.
For these reasons, high levels of concentration and high price-cost margins
can result quite naturally in today’s economy from competitive processes playing
out in ways that beneﬁt consumers. This critical observation has very important
policy implications. Efforts to proactively deconcentrate industries can easily be
counterproductive—by disrupting economic efficiency and harming consumers—if they (1) force the breakup of the most successful and efficient ﬁrms; (2)
prevent ﬁrms from achieving the available economies of scale; or (3) discourage
ﬁrms from competing and growing for fear that they will later be broken up.
These dangers were quite relevant in the 1960s, when proposals were ﬂoated to

40.

Michael Salinger, The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 287, 287.

41.

See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
42. One robust empirical ﬁnding in industrial organization literature is that competing ﬁrms differ greatly in their efficiency. See, for example, Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, Why Do
Management Practices Differ Across Firms and Countries, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 203 (2010), and the
references therein.
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actively deconcentrate American industry. Most signiﬁcant in this regard was the
1968 “Neal Report,” which proposed passage of a “Concentrated Industries
Act.” 43 This Act would have directed the Attorney General “to affirmatively
search out all ‘oligopoly industries’ in the United States . . . and bring legal proceedings against all ‘oligopoly ﬁrms’ with the aim of reducing the share of each
oligopoly ﬁrm to no more than 12%.”44
More generally, modern industrial organization economics strongly supports
the view that antitrust policy must always be careful not to discourage ﬁrms,
even large ﬁrms, from competing on the merits to attract more customers. This
idea is captured well by what has become the mantra of modern antitrust policy:
the goal of antitrust is “the protection of competition, not competitors.” 45 The
United States has not only led the way in recognizing this important principle
but also spent decades exporting this core principle to competition authorities
around the world.
What does all this mean for merger enforcement?
First and foremost, economic theory and a wide range of economic evidence
support the conclusion that horizontal mergers that signiﬁcantly increase market
concentration are likely to lessen competition and harm consumers by raising
prices, reducing output, or limiting product quality or innovation. We have in
mind here not only the intraindustry studies on market concentration and pricecost margins noted above, but also (1) decades of experience with merger enforcement at the DOJ and the FTC and in the courts; (2) evidence regarding how
business executives evaluate competition and make strategic decisions; and (3)
analyses showing that reducing trade barriers and allowing foreign rivals to compete in a domestic market lead to greater productivity, better management practices, and lower prices.46 Importantly, as shown especially by John Kwoka, the

43.

PHIL C. NEAL ET AL., REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, 115
CONG. REC. S15933, S16036 (daily ed. June 16, 1969). Phil Neal was the Chairman of the Task
Force.
44. Id. at 2. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 217 (2009) (discussing the background of the Report and
its understanding of oligopolies).
45. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); accord Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) (quoting Atl. Richﬁeld Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)).
46. For a discussion of a tiny portion of this evidence, which is extensively developed in the literature on international trade, see Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the
Bull’s Eye?, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 389-94 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012).
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evidence from merger retrospectives strongly supports the structural presumption by ﬁnding links between concentration and postmerger price increases.47
Second, the modern view that the competitive process often leads to highly
concentrated markets makes it all the more important to prevent the victors of that
process from joining forces by merging. If two ﬁrms have each effectively
achieved a large scale of operations or learned how to run their operations efficiently, consumers beneﬁt greatly when they compete vigorously against each
other. So, logically, the empirical regularities cited above—that large ﬁrms are
often the most efficient and the efficiency achieved at the leading ﬁrms is difficult
for other ﬁrms to imitate or for new entrants to achieve—caution strongly
against allowing the merger of two incumbents with large market shares, that
being the best single indicator of success. Growth by smaller ﬁrms and entry
cannot in general be relied upon to replace the competition lost through such a
merger. This conclusion applies not only to price competition but also to other
forms of competition that may be more important in the long run, namely competition to develop and introduce new and improved products and services. Indeed, one of the most important roles for merger enforcement is to prevent established incumbents from acquiring mavericks, disruptive entrants, or other
ﬁrms that threaten their positions. For that reason, it is important to be forwardlooking when estimating the market shares of such ﬁrms.
Those who call for weakening or abandoning the structural presumption effectively argue that recent market success does not reliably predict future market
success.48 But this position is unsupported by the evidence. In the presence of
economies of scale, which are likely to exist in a concentrated market, a small
incumbent ﬁrm or an entrant is unlikely to be as effective a competitor as a larger
ﬁrm. If ﬁrms differ greatly in their efficiencies, and if it is difficult for the less
efficient ﬁrms to imitate their more efficient rivals (as is common), we will see a
strong correlation between market share and efficiency. Again, if a ﬁrm with a

47.

See generally John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger Review:
False Positives or Unwarranted Concerns?, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 837-872 (2017) (ﬁnding that
empirical data from past mergers conﬁrms the presumption that concentration over a certain
threshold produces anticompetitive effects). For a comprehensive look at merger retrospectives, see generally JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2015). Michael Vita and F. David Osinski critique part of
Kwoka’s book in Michael Vita & F. David Osinski, John Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control and
Remedies: A Critical Review (Dec. 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with authors). Kwoka responds to this critique in John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control and Remedies: A Response to the FTC Critique (Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with
authors).
48. E.g., John Harkrider, Proving Anticompetitive Impact: Moving Past Merger Guidelines Presumptions, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 317.
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large market share is acquired, it is unlikely that smaller, less efficient ﬁrms or
entrants will be able to replace the lost competition in a timely manner. Likewise,
if the merging ﬁrms own valuable speciﬁc assets that are difficult to replicate—
such as brand names, established relationships with customers, or important intellectual property—entry is unlikely to protect consumers from the loss of competition resulting from the merger.
In short, the structural presumption ﬁts well not only with the economic evidence but also with business reality: as a general rule, ﬁrms with large market
shares make for more effective competitors than ﬁrms with small market shares.
When two of them merge, it takes time for the competition lost in the merger to
be effectively replaced by smaller ﬁrms or entrants.49
ii. structure and presumptions in the case law and
guidelines
Not only is the structural presumption theoretically and empirically justiﬁed,
but it is also very well-established in the case law. Challenges facing the courts
tend to fall into two categories: (a) what evidence is sufficient to establish the
presumption; and (b) once established, what must defendants show to rebut the
presumption?
The decision most identiﬁed with merger laws driven by structural presumptions is Philadelphia National Bank, in which the Supreme Court appeared
to make market structure almost decisive.50 The Court observed that, because
private business needed to be able to engage in planning, merger rules must be
predictable and less prone to error. As a result, courts should “simplify the test
of illegality” in the “interest of sound and practical judicial administration.”51
With that, the Court held that a merger producing a ﬁrm that controls an “undue
percentage share” of the market and that “results in a signiﬁcant increase in the
49.

While in theory sufficient merger-speciﬁc synergies could make up for the loss of competition
resulting from the merger (so consumers gain rather than lose), we are aware of no economic
evidence indicating that such efficiencies are common. Certainly there is no such evidence
sufficient to undermine the structural presumption as a general matter. In any event, the structural presumption is rebuttable. One means by which the merging parties might be able to
rebut the presumption is through an efficiencies defense. While the Supreme Court has never
recognized such a defense, lower courts have been open to evidence about efficiencies. See 4
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ch. 9E (analyzing cases).
50. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see also Symposium, Philadelphia National Bank at 50, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 189 (2015) (interviewing Judge Posner for his contributions to Justice Brennan’s opinion in Philadelphia National Bank and its emphasis on the structural presumption).
51. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
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concentration of ﬁrms in that market” is “inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially.”52 As a result, it must be enjoined, at least “in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects.”53
The Court then found such “undue” concentration based on the merging
ﬁrms’ premerger market shares of 17% and 13% and a CR4 of around 70%.54
These numbers exceeded the standards for illegality in merger cases of that era,55
although they would not necessarily generate a challenge today. Beyond condemning the merger in this case, the Supreme Court did not specify the size of
an “undue” percentage or the amount of a “signiﬁcant” increase and said nothing
about overall market concentration levels.56 That last point is perplexing because
it suggests the Court was apparently not worried about overall market concentration as such, but mainly about the market shares of the merging partners. The
Court also made clear that the market-share-based conclusion was presumptive.
It applied only “in the absence of evidence” showing that the merger would not
have the feared anticompetitive effects.57 The Court also did not decide how burdens of proof should be assigned.
The Supreme Court’s ﬁrst major qualiﬁcation of Philadelphia National Bank
came in 1974 in its General Dynamics decision.58 Brushing aside the government’s
challenge, the Supreme Court concluded that the government’s reliance on the

52.
53.
54.

55.

56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 363-72. The CR4 consists of the sum of the market shares of the market’s four largest
ﬁrms. The 1968 Merger Guidelines employed the CR4, but the index was replaced in the 1982
Merger Guidelines by the HHI, which is measured by the squares of the market shares of all
ﬁrms in the market. See 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at 12-13. Salop estimates that
the merger between PNB and Girard would have increased the HHI from 1459 to 2037 in the
market for loans, and from 1442 to 2059 in the market for deposits. Salop, supra note 6, at 273
tbl.1.
See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966) (White, J., concurring)
(noting that the acquisition, which the majority held invalid under Section 7 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act, had a premerger CR4 of 24.4% and merging partner shares of 4.7% and 4.2%).
Other cases leading to condemnation on low market shares and/or concentration include
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 399 U.S. 350, 365-69 (1970); United States
v. Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 181-83 (1968); United States v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-53 (1966); United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458-66
(1964); and United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 277-81 (1964).
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 363.
See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974).
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merging ﬁrms’ historical market shares in the production and sale of coal in certain geographic areas exaggerated the merger’s anticompetitive effects. 59 The
district court had found the alleged market to be too narrowly deﬁned, given that
coal was steadily losing market share to oil and natural gas.60 Further, the companies’ depleted reserves strongly suggested that historical market shares would
not be a reliable predictor of the merged ﬁrm’s future competitive presence.61
The Supreme Court affirmed, focusing largely on the second ground.62
The Supreme Court’s General Dynamics analysis did not attack the structural
presumption as such. It is better read as cautioning how market shares should
be measured and understood in order to determine whether the structural presumption applies. 63 The D.C. Circuit’s 1990 opinion in Baker Hughes thus
overread General Dynamics on this point.64 However, the Baker Hughes decision
also emphasized the esoteric nature of the market in that case—the U.S. market
for hard-rock hydraulic underground drilling rigs—which was characterized by
a very small number of transactions and, as a result, wide annual variations in
market share data based on sales.65 While a low number of annual sales can make
market share data noisy, and thus suggest that measuring market shares over a
longer period of time would result in greater accuracy, we do not see why it reduces the danger of collusion. One could just as easily conclude to the contrary.66
The Baker Hughes opinion also produced a startling conclusion about the burden-shifting framework—namely, that “[i]mposing a heavy burden of production” on defendants’ rebuttal to structural evidence would be “anomalous where,
as here, it is easy to establish a prima facie case.”67 The court appeared to be saying that where high market shares make the government’s prima facie structural
case strong, and thus easy to make,68 some sense of justice requires that the defendant’s case be correspondingly easy to make as well. This makes little sense

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

Id. at 501.
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 538-40 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Id. at 559-60.
Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 501-02.
See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 962a.
United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 986.
See George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston
Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201, 206-10 (1982) (explaining the relationship between lumpiness
of sales and propensity for collusion).
Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 992.
See id. at 983 & n.3. The premerger market shares were 40.8% and 17.5%, and in one year the
two ﬁrms enjoyed a combined share of 76%. Id. at 983 n.3.
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to us. When the plaintiff ’s case is stronger, the defendant’s case is accordingly
weaker and will naturally be harder to prove. At that point the court launched an
attack against the “role of statistics” in Section 7 actions, referring expressly to
the HHI.69
Notwithstanding Baker Hughes’s analytical shortcomings, the decision has
attained considerable importance in merger litigation, giving rise to what is commonly called the “Baker Hughes presumption.” As formulated in the D.C. Circuit’s Heinz decision:
First the government must show that the merger would produce a ﬁrm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and
[would] result[] in a signiﬁcant increase in the concentration of ﬁrms in
that market. Such a showing establishes a presumption that the merger
will substantially lessen competition. To rebut the presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that show[s] that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger’s] probable effects on
competition in the relevant market. If the defendant successfully rebuts
the presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and merges
with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.70
In fact, the widely-followed Heinz statement71 of the burden-shifting framework is not very distinct from the Philadelphia National Bank Court’s ﬁndings.
There the Court wrote:
[W]e think that a merger which produces a ﬁrm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a signiﬁcant increase in the concentration of ﬁrms in that market, is so inherently likely

69.

Id. at 992.
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
71. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th
Cir. 2015) (applying a similar framework to that of the Philadelphia National Bank Court);
FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *64 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (similar); United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 49-50 (D.D.C. 2011).
70.
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to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
such anticompetitive effects.72
The Philadelphia National Bank Court was clearly concerned about the “rising
tide of economic concentration in the American economy.”73 At the same time,
however, it wished to simplify the test of illegality so that “businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a merger with some conﬁdence.”74 As a result,
“elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects” was unnecessary. This latter goal was addressed by the Merger
Guidelines. The structural presumption was not originally based on any particular mechanism by which a merger would lessen competition, but rather on the
general notion that competition is strongest when there are many ﬁrms, none
with a large market share. The 1968 Merger Guidelines adopted this highly
structural approach to merger review and enforcement, stating that “the primary
role of Section 7 enforcement is to preserve and promote market structures conducive to competition.”75
The 1982 Guidelines took merger enforcement in a somewhat different direction, giving much less weight to market concentration and much more weight
to the predicted competitive effects of a merger. The 1982 Merger Guidelines
state, “The unifying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance ‘market power’ or to facilitate its exercise.”76 Under
the 1982 Merger Guidelines, the predicted competitive effects of a proposed merger were generally evaluated based on whether that merger would make cartellike coordination more likely or more effective. That approach ﬁt well with the
structural presumption, applying George Stigler’s theory that the HHI metric of
market concentration also measures the risk of collusion.77
Beginning with the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, some version of the
burden-shifting framework has also been included in agency enforcement policy. The 1992 Guidelines make market share thresholds presumptive, together

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
Id. (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962)).
Id. at 362.
1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 2.
1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, § I.
George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 55 (1964). William Baxter, the
Assistant Attorney General who issued the 1982 Merger Guidelines, was strongly inﬂuenced
by Stigler’s work. On Stigler’s inﬂuence on Baxter, see Dennis W. Carlton & Sam Peltzman,
Introduction to Stigler’s Theory of Oligopoly, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 237, 248 (2010).
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with language indicating that “[t]he presumption may be overcome by a showing that factors set forth [elsewhere in the Guidelines] make it unlikely that the
merger will create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise, in light of
market concentration and market shares.”78
Those guidelines also state, however, that they do not “attempt to assign the
burden of proof, or the burden of coming forward with evidence, on any particular issue.”79 The 2010 Guidelines actually come the closest to incorporating the
presumption as it was originally articulated in Philadelphia National Bank:
The Agencies give weight to the merging parties’ market shares in a relevant market, the level of concentration, and the change in concentration
caused by the merger. Mergers that cause a signiﬁcant increase in concentration and result in highly concentrated markets are presumed to be
likely to enhance market power, but this presumption can be rebutted by
persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.80
The courts have been quite receptive to the changing structural standards in
the Guidelines as they have evolved from the ﬁrst set, issued in 1968, to the current 2010 Guidelines. Both the structural thresholds and the weight to be given
to them have varied, and the courts have gone along—implicitly agreeing that as
evidence and theory in this area change, the agencies have the discretion to respond accordingly.81
iii. the structural presumption in unilateral effects cases
A more consequential shift that occurred with the release of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines was the explicit introduction of “unilateral effects” into

78.

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.51(c) (1992 & 1997), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-0 [http://perma.cc/JFS5-79FJ].
79. Id. § 0.1.
80. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at § 2.1.3 (citation omitted).
81. For discussions of the gradual evolution of the Guidelines, see Donald I. Baker & William
Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 311 (1983) (discussing
the 1982 Guidelines); Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 619 (2010) (discussing the 2010 Guidelines); and Thomas B. Leary, The
Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (2002) (discussing
the 1992 Guidelines, as revised in 1997).
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merger analysis.82 Unilateral effects arise when a merger eliminates competition
between two merging ﬁrms but does not alter the manner in which the other
ﬁrms in the market compete. As a result, the theory of unilateral effects does not
depend on any assumption of market-wide coordination among rivals. Now,
twenty-ﬁve years later, the clear majority of merger investigations focuses on
unilateral effects; only a minority focuses on coordinated effects.83 Overall, this
has been a positive development, reﬂecting a shift in the U.S. economy away
from commodities and manufacturing and toward differentiated products and
services. But this shift has posed a challenge for the structural presumption because unilateral effects largely depend on the extent of direct competition, or “diversion,” between the merging ﬁrms, rather than on the overall level of market
concentration. Indeed, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that “[t]he
Agencies rely much more on the value of diverted sales than on the level of the
HHI for diagnosing unilateral price effects in markets with differentiated products.”84
Despite the shift in merger enforcement toward unilateral effects, the Philadelphia National Bank presumption based on structural evidence and the opportunity to rebut remains alive and well in horizontal merger analysis. As articulated in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the basic contours of the
presumption have been adapted to unilateral effects analysis, where the primary
inquiry is not based on overall market concentration but rather on the relative
degree of substitution between the merging ﬁrms’ output and the predicted impact of the merger on the postmerger ﬁrm’s own prices.85
82.

See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.2 (Apr. 8, 1997), http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/attachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf [http://perma.cc
/BC3M-WVGX].
83. See Malcolm B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, How Much Does the Choice Between Collusion
and Unilateral Effects Matter in Merger Analysis? 1 (Nov. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2995679 [http://perma.cc/HQ89-7Q7V] (noting that
“[t]he share of (non-monopoly) merger investigations studied under a unilateral effects theory grew, with some ups and downs, from 16 percent in ﬁscal years 1989-1992, to more than
half in 1999-2000, to 76 percent in 2011-2014”).
84. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at § 6.1. See Shapiro, supra note 12, for an extended
analysis of unilateral price effects in markets with differentiated products.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171 (D.D.C.), aff ’d, 855 F.3d 345 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 2250 (2017) (applying the Baker Hughes burden-shifting analysis
in a unilateral effects case); FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15, 23 (D.D.C. 2015) (permitting a rebuttal to a prima facie unilateral effects case, but agreeing with the FTC that an
injunction should be issued against a proposed merger); United States v. H&R Block, Inc. 833
F. Supp. 2d 36, 49-50 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying the Baker Hughes burden-shifting analysis in a
unilateral effects case); FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 47-49 (D.D.C. 2009)
(discussing evidence of historic entry by new ﬁrms).
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The extent to which the structural presumption operates in unilateral effects
cases invites an additional concern: to what extent can a “structural” presumption be said to apply when a particular type of merger analysis does not require
a market deﬁnition at all? Economic analysis of unilateral effects can proceed
without deﬁning a relevant market, although there is some question about
whether such analysis is permitted by the statute.86 The language of Section 7
requires those challenging a merger to identify some “line of commerce” and
“section of the country” in which the anticompetitive effects of a merger will be
felt. In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court interpreted the term “line of commerce”
to refer to a relevant product market, and the term “section of the country” to
refer to a relevant geographic market.87
The legislative history of Section 7 is not entirely clear on the issue, but more
likely than not the two phrases were never intended to have so precise a meaning.
The phrase “line of commerce” was in widespread use by both businesspeople
and courts to describe a particular “line” that a seller might sell, often including
nonsubstitutable goods.88 The phrase “section of the country” was very likely
intended to be jurisdictional—that is, to ensure that the statute reached only anticompetitive effects felt within the United States.89 By 1950, when the amendments to Section 7 were drafted, courts had already begun to use the term “relevant market,”90 and if that is what Congress meant, they very likely would have
used it. The effect of this reading is not particularly important in a traditional
concentration-increasing merger where the threat is of collusion or collusionlike behavior. For example, use of the HHI requires that a relevant market, i.e.,

86.

87.

88.

89.
90.

See, e.g., Deborah L. Feinstein et al., Merger Guidelines Revisited?, 24 ANTITRUST 8 (2009)
(providing commentary contemporaneously with the 2010 Guidelines and expressing doubt
that one could do merger analysis without deﬁning a relevant market).
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (“The ‘area of effective competition’ must be determined by reference to a product market (the ‘line of commerce’) and a
geographic market (the ‘section of the country’).”); accord United States v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 491 (1974); FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
E.g., Gilbert v. Citizens’ Nat’l Bank of Chickasha, 160 P. 635, 641 (Okla. 1916) (holding that
contract interpretation depends upon the customs or usage of trade of “those engaged in that
line of commerce.” (quoting Mobile Fruit & Trading Co. v. Judy & Son, 91 Ill. App. 82, 90
(1900))).
See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 887, 892 (2012)
(discussing other decisions).
See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 508 (1948) (disagreeing with the
government on the selection of the relevant market); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (using the term “market”).
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line of commerce, be identiﬁed before concentration can be assessed. The requirement can become an unnecessary and counterproductive encumbrance,
however, in unilateral effects cases, which examine diversion of sales as between
speciﬁc pairs of ﬁrms. In unilateral effects cases involving differentiated products, drawing an artiﬁcial boundary between products that are close enough substitutes to be “in the market” and those that are not is simply not a part of the
economic analysis of likely competitive effects.91 Put differently, in most cases,
unilateral effects can be estimated without the need to deﬁne a relevant antitrust
market, and the legal requirement that it be done does not assist in this analysis.
In any event, Brown Shoe not only equated the two statutory phrases with
relevant markets, but also found that Congress did not explicitly accept or reject
particular tests for measuring relevant markets, “either as deﬁned in terms of
product or in terms of geographic locus of competition, within which the anticompetitive effects of a merger were to be judged.”92
A completely acceptable reading of this language is that any grouping of sales
identiﬁed as experiencing a non-cost-justiﬁed price increase can be considered a
“relevant market” for the purpose of merger analysis. Happily for economists,
this approach lines up very well with relevant markets deﬁned using the HMT:
if the merged ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to signiﬁcantly raise prices unilaterally
after the merger, then the HMT as applied to the merging ﬁrms’ products will
be satisﬁed.93 It does not matter if conventional market deﬁnition criteria under
Brown Shoe would also have identiﬁed a broader grouping of products as a relevant market. For example, if a merger of ﬁrms A and B with harmful unilateral
effects would lead to a signiﬁcant price increase, then postmerger the products
sold by ﬁrm AB become the grouping of products over which the effects of that
merger are to be judged. It does not matter that ﬁrms A and B may also sell in a
larger product market that also includes products sold by other ﬁrms.94
Brown Shoe rather awkwardly gave some credence to this approach by acknowledging that even when a market is deﬁned, relevant “submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.”95 The
91.

92.
93.

94.
95.

Various methods are available to evaluate competitive effects, including looking at diversion
ratios, calculating upward pricing pressure, and performing merger simulation, but none of
these rely on market deﬁnition.
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320-21.
The converse is not true, since the HMT takes as given the prices of all products outside the
candidate market and assumes no entry into the relevant market, which makes it more likely
that the price increase in question will be proﬁt-maximizing for the merged ﬁrm.
For earlier discussion about the HMT and our point that a merger violates section 7 if it is
likely to harm competition in any relevant market, see supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.

2016

horizontal mergers, market structure, and burdens of proof

term “submarket” has been widely criticized as permitting narrow markets to be
deﬁned that are in fact not relevant groupings for determining a ﬁrm’s ability to
increase prices.96 But the point here is that under unilateral effects analysis, the
term is being applied to a grouping of sales over which the postmerger ﬁrm does
have the power to increase prices. Indeed, that is how most courts interpret the
term today: a relevant submarket, just like a relevant market, is a grouping of
sales capable of proﬁtably sustaining a non-cost-justiﬁed price increase.97
We suggest that courts either drop the awkward and unnecessary “submarket” label, because properly deﬁned “submarkets” are themselves relevant markets, or simplify matters by explicitly stating that a merger harming competition
in a properly deﬁned “submarket” is illegal.98 In speaking to this issue, the district court in Oracle observed that Brown Shoe really suggested that “the technical
deﬁnition of a relevant market in an antitrust case may be smaller than a layperson would normally consider to be a market.”99 In any event, while some courts
have employed the term “submarkets” in their analysis of unilateral effects
cases,100 most of them, including Oracle, have generally rejected the idea that a
“submarket” is a different concept from a market. We reiterate, however, that in
a unilateral effects merger case calling the two-ﬁrm grouping over which a price
increase is threatened, a “market” need not do any harm to the concept of market
deﬁnition. It also does not preclude a ﬁnding that some larger grouping of sales
including these two ﬁrms is also a relevant market. At the same time, however,
at least some decisions appear to require a market deﬁnition in a unilateral effects
case.101
iv. market structure, competition, and consumer welfare
Our analysis so far has assumed that the goal of merger enforcement policy
is to promote competition, even if the result of competition is that larger or more
efficient ﬁrms win the competitive battle against smaller or less efficient ones. In

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See, e.g., 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 533.
See 4 id. ¶ 522.
See id. ¶ 913.
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997).
See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2008). However, and
somewhat mysteriously, the court suggested that a market deﬁnition would not necessarily be
“crucial to the FTC’s likelihood of success on the merits” in a case seeking a preliminary injunction. Id.
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practice, merger policy has sought to promote competition by applying the consumer welfare standard, under which a merger is judged to be anticompetitive if
it disrupts the competitive process and harms trading parties on the other side
of the market.
As we will now explain, for over one hundred years, the goal of merger policy
has generally been to promote competition. Preventing markets from becoming
highly concentrated through mergers has been seen as a means to promoting
competition, not as a separate goal in and of itself.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was originally passed in 1914 and has been subject to only one major amendment in substance, the Celler-Kefauver Act of
1950.102 Most of the dramatic changes in merger policy that came soon after resulted more from the legislative history of that provision rather than from actual
changes to the statute’s text.103 The text itself merely expanded Section 7 to cover
vertical as well as horizontal mergers, and to reach asset acquisitions as well as
stock acquisitions.
In the subsequent economic and enforcement literature, market structure has
never been a freestanding target of merger policy. Rather, market structure has
been a means of tackling merger law’s more fundamental concerns, which are
higher prices or reduced output or other consumer harms that result from less
competitive market structures. Bain, the principal architect of the so-called
“Structure-Conduct-Performance” paradigm, was clear about this as early as the
1950s,104 as were his followers.105
Supreme Court merger policy has been somewhat less consistent, with some
wavering during the 1960s. Most notably, although the 1962 Brown Shoe merger
decision (the ﬁrst to interpret the 1950 amendments) emphasized the evils of
high concentration, it actually condemned the merger based on the district
court’s factual ﬁndings that the postmerger ﬁrm would be in a position to undersell its rivals—offering either lower-priced shoes or shoes of higher quality

102.

Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1225 (codiﬁed as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)). In addition, the statute was amended in 1980 to reach
mergers by ﬁrms other than corporations and also acquisitions “in . . . or affecting” commerce. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat.
1154, 1157-58 (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)).
103. Bok, supra note 17, at 233-38 (discussing this history).
104. See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 408-10 (1959) (discussing the relationship
between market structure and efficiency); id. at 411-16 (discussing the relationship of market
structure to price-cost margins, concluding that “high seller concentration tends to be connected with substantially higher rates of excess proﬁt”).
105. See, e.g., Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1979).
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for the same price.106 That is, the perceived evil of high concentration in that case
was scale or scope economies107 that served to give a large ﬁrm a competitive
advantage over its rivals and to deliver lower prices to consumers. As then-antitrust professor Bok lamented, that concern was actually quite consistent with the
legislative history.108
Except for that interlude, however,109 the DOJ and eventually the FTC have
generally agreed that merger policy should be concerned with high prices and
other consumer harms; measuring concentration is simply a mechanism for assessing the risk of such harms.110 Even the 1968 Merger Guidelines recognized
this fact, concluding that “a concentrated market structure, where a few ﬁrms
account for a large share of the sales, tends to discourage vigorous price competition . . . and to encourage other kinds of conduct, such as . . . inefficient methods of production or excessive promotional expenditures, of an economically undesirable nature.” 111 As noted above, the 1982 Merger Guidelines were quite
explicit about the purpose behind the DOJ’s merger enforcement: “The unifying
theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance ‘market power’ or to facilitate its exercise.”112 The fundamental concern
with high prices and consumer harms rather than concentration as such is particularly clear when we consider unilateral effects tests under the more recent
Guidelines, including those issued in 2010. Under unilateral effects analysis,
market concentration and even market deﬁnition itself are at most secondary
concerns. Rather, one seeks to measure anticipated price effects more directly.113

106.

107.

108.
109.
110.

111.
112.
113.

United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff ’d, 370 U.S. 294
(1962) (condemning the merger because it gave the postmerger ﬁrm decisive advantages, resulting in “lower prices or in higher quality for the same price,” with the effect that “the independent retailer can no longer compete”).
Most particularly, the case involved economies of distribution, resulting in condemnation of
the vertical aspect of the merger from Brown’s production facilities to Kinney’s retail stores.
Id.
Bok, supra note 17, at 236.
Brown Shoe and other big 1960s-era merger cases were brought by either the Antitrust Division or the FTC, not by private plaintiffs.
Prior to 1950, the FTC’s concerns were much more with high concentration as such. See, e.g.,
TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 77-35 (1st
Sess. 1941) (observing trends toward greater concentration and recommending correctives);
FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT (1948) (discussing high concentration).
1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 2.
1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at 2.
Overall, the 2010 Guidelines describe the relevant evidence as speaking to whether “the merging parties intend to raise prices, reduce output or capacity, reduce product quality or variety,
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One reason for the disconnect between current policy and the Brown Shoe
concerns with the price-reducing potential of larger ﬁrms is the language of Section 7 itself. It speaks of mergers that may “lessen competition” without deﬁning
what “competition” means.114 Does “lessened competition” refer to lower output
and higher price-cost margins, or rather to a market structure with fewer ﬁrms?
If the former, then a merger creating a larger, more efficient ﬁrm that charges
lower prices is welcome. If the latter, such a merger is unwelcome, especially if
that ﬁrm will drive smaller, less-efficient ﬁrms out of business. Both of these are
more or less consistent with the lay understanding of “competition.” Applying a
consumer welfare standard favors the former, which is clearly the intention of
the 2010 Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines deﬁne competitive harm in terms
of mergers that “encourage one or more ﬁrms to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”115
We wholeheartedly support the ongoing application of the consumer welfare
standard, as we have used the term here, as the means by which antitrust promotes competition in practice. We are unaware of any practical alternative that
would be superior. For example, we very much doubt that the DOJ and FTC
could evaluate proposed mergers based on their impact on political power in a
manner that would be predictable and consistent with the rule of law, without
dangerously politicizing merger enforcement. We also fear that evaluating mergers based on protecting small businesses or their employment effects would
hinder rather than promote long-run economic growth.
We always welcome policy proposals designed to improve the effectiveness
of merger enforcement. However, any call to abandon the consumer welfare
standard, around which a broad bipartisan consensus has formed over the past
ﬁfty years based on extensive practical experience, should at a minimum offer a
speciﬁc alternative, explain how that alternative would work in practice, and
demonstrate using real-world cases and evidence why the proposed alternative
would be superior to current practice. We have seen no proposal coming close to
meeting these requirements.

withdraw products or delay their introduction, or curtail research and development efforts
after the merger, or explicit or implicit evidence that the ability to engage in such conduct
motivated the merger . . . .” 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 4.
114. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
115. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, § 2.
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v. current legislative efforts to strengthen merger
enforcement
Assuming the courts embrace the overall framework that the Supreme Court
established in Philadelphia National Bank, we believe that merger enforcement
can be signiﬁcantly strengthened through a combination of suitable enforcement
actions taken by the DOJ, the FTC, and state attorneys general. This framework
should be updated to reﬂect the experience gained from merger enforcement and
advances in industrial organization economics since that decision. In this manner, merger enforcement can be made signiﬁcantly stronger without the need for
new legislation. Legislative changes could, of course, go further and operate far
more rapidly than can government enforcement actions and the resulting development of the case law. But legislative changes can also create new problems and
have unintended effects, so caution is needed.
In September 2017, Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota, the Ranking
Member on the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, along with several Democratic cosponsors, introduced the Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017.116
This bill is designed to make merger enforcement more aggressive, but appears
unlikely to pass in the current Republican-controlled Congress. Nevertheless,
alongside the antitrust plank in the Democratic Party platform attending the
2016 election,117 it reﬂects concerns that merger enforcement has not been aggressive enough in recent years.
First, the bill would substitute the Clayton Act’s language barring mergers
that “substantially” lessen competition with the word “materially,” which the bill
deﬁnes as “more than a de minimis amount.”118 We welcome this change, which
is clearly intended to strengthen the government’s hand in court, although we
are uncertain just how it will actually affect litigated merger cases.
Second, the bill would substitute the phrase “monopoly or a monopsony”
for the term “monopoly.”119 We are unclear why the drafters included this language, because Section 7 currently reaches mergers among buyers, as recognized

116.

S. 1812, 115th Cong. (2017).
117. See 2016 Democratic Party Platform, DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMMITTEE 11 (July 2016), http://
s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CT72-9QVU].
118. S. 1812 § 2(b)(2).
119. Id. § 3(2).
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by both the case law120 and the 2010 Merger Guidelines.121 But the language may
help clarify and emphasize for the courts that harm to suppliers, such as farmers
or workers, that results from a merger between their customers can violate Section 7.
In general, a merger that harms counterparties to the merging ﬁrms by restricting the competitive choices available to them can violate Section 7. In the
“normal” case where two competing sellers are merging, the potentially harmed
counterparties are their customers. The canonical harm comes in the form of
higher prices charged by the merging ﬁrms, which restricts demand. These customers may themselves be businesses, or they may be ﬁnal consumers. When
two competing sellers merge, antitrust attorneys and economists usually refer to
the impact on “consumers,” but it is more accurate to refer to the impact on “customers.”122 An important question in any such merger is whether the merging
ﬁrms are two of only a few suppliers to which certain customers can turn. When
two competing buyers are merging, the economic analysis is formally equivalent,
but with a different set of labels. The potentially harmed counterparties are the
suppliers to the merging parties, and the canonical harm comes in the form of
lower prices paid by the merging ﬁrms for the input in question, which restricts
supply.123 An important question in any such merger is whether the merging
ﬁrms are two of only a few customers to which certain suppliers can sell. One
reason there are relatively few buy-side merger challenges is that it is relatively
rare for the merging ﬁrms to be two of only a few customers to which their suppliers can turn.124
Third, under this bill, in a case brought by the DOJ, the FTC, or a state attorney general (but not private plaintiffs), a merger would be illegal if it “would

120.
121.
122.

123.

124.

E.g., United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (granting a preliminary
injunction).
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 32-33.
When the direct customers of the merging parties are harmed, it may be presumed that some
harm will ﬂow downstream to ﬁnal consumers as well, as the higher prices are passed through
to some degree.
In the case of “classic monopsony,” the sole buyer reduces the quantity purchased, which
drives down the equilibrium price. This situation applies when a single buyer purchases from
many suppliers of a homogeneous good who are price-takers. In the more common situation
in which the inputs are differentiated, or in which the buyer negotiates with its suppliers, the
mechanism is different, and the lower price will tend over time to reduce the quantity, quality,
or variety of the products supplied, as suppliers make various investment decisions.
See, for example, United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 356, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017), where
the panel majority and a dissenter considered whether lower prices paid to providers were an
efficiency “defense” to the merger or rather constituted an anticompetitive exercise of monopsony power. See Hovenkamp, supra note 7.
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lead to a signiﬁcant increase in market concentration” in any domestic market,
“unless the acquiring and acquired person establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the effect of the acquisition will not be to tend to materially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly or a monopsony.”125 This part of the
bill appears to codify the Philadelphia National Bank structural presumption
found in the case law, but it does not specify the level or increase in concentration
required for the presumption to apply. This part of the bill also seems quite useful, as it would prevent the courts at all levels from undermining or otherwise
weakening the structural presumption, as some have favored.126 If desired, the
bill could enable a more assertive merger enforcement policy by requiring clear
and convincing evidence to rebut the structural presumption.
Fourth, the bill would permit one of the federal enforcement agencies or a
state attorney general (but not private plaintiffs) to challenge a merger where, as
a consequence, the acquiring ﬁrm’s interest in the acquired ﬁrm exceeds an adjusted value of $5 billion; or one of the merging ﬁrms has assets, net annual sales,
or market capitalization exceeding $100 billion; and if, as a result of the acquisition, the acquiring ﬁrm would hold an aggregate of voting securities and assets
of the acquired ﬁrm exceeding $5 billion.127 If these absolute value thresholds
are exceeded, then the merger is presumptively unlawful and the burden shifts
to the proponent of the merger to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the merger will not have the stated anticompetitive result. This provision
does not require that the merging ﬁrms be competitors or potential competitors,
or even in a supplier-customer relationship, provided the size thresholds are met.
Of course, a merger between noncompeting ﬁrms does not increase market
concentration. We recommend that this bill be revised to more accurately address competition concerns without encompassing mergers that pose no threat
to competition. Assuming that this provision is motivated by a concern about
market concentration and market power, and the obstacles that the government
faces when challenging mergers in court, we would prefer to see this provision
revised to target horizontal mergers. For example, the bill could provide that the

125.

S. 1812, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017).
As a notable example, in its public comments on the proposed 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association took the position that “market
concentration presumptions should be removed from the Merger Guidelines.” AM. B. ASS’N,
Comment on Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines 12 (June 4, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites
/default/ﬁles/documents/public_comments/horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project
-proposed-new-horizontal-merger-guidelines-548050-00026/548050-00026.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5ZF8-DB7R].
127. The $100 billion and $5 billion limits would automatically be adjusted annually based on the
growth of the U.S. gross national product. S. 1812 § 3(3)(2)(B)(i).
126.
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government can establish a presumption that the merger violates Section 7 if the
government can show that the merger would lead to a signiﬁcant increase in
concentration in any domestic market, so long as the alleged market is plausible.
That would signiﬁcantly reduce the burden on the government to deﬁne the relevant market in order to establish its prima facie case. Or the bill could specify
that in order for the merging parties to rebut the government’s presumption
based on ease of entry, they must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
entry will be timely, likely, and sufficient to deter or counteract the feared anticompetitive effects.128
Lastly, the bill also contains a provision requiring ongoing postacquisition
reporting for transactions resolved through a consent decree with the DOJ or the
FTC. 129 The bill also would establish an Office of the Competition Advocate
within the FTC.130 The Competition Advocate’s principal duty would be to listen
to various interest groups and prepare reports about areas meriting antitrust investigation. We strongly support these activities, along with the Data Center
called for within that Office. While the FTC already publishes numerous reports
relating to general policy questions of this nature, the Office of the Competition
Advocate would have subpoena authority to collect the information it needs,
even if no litigation is pursued. This provision, if enacted, would fulﬁll a critical
need by greatly improving the FTC’s ability to perform merger retrospectives.
conclusion
Merger analysis is almost always a predictive exercise involving considerable
uncertainty. As a result, burdens of proof matter a great deal. The structural presumption—that a merger is anticompetitive if it leads to a signiﬁcant increase in
market concentration—has therefore proven essential to effective merger enforcement. This presumption is strongly supported by economic theory and evidence, as well as the experience gained in merger enforcement over the past ﬁfty
years. Furthermore, the existing case law, dating to the Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 decision in Philadelphia National Bank, allows the DOJ, the FTC, state
attorneys general, and the lower courts to apply the presumption more broadly

128.

We assume that the bill is motivated by concerns about market power, rather than by other
important concerns, such as the political power of large ﬁrms, a critical problem facing our
democracy. We would strongly prefer that such concerns be addressed separately, for example
through campaign ﬁnance reform, greater transparency, tougher ethics rules, or other legislation that addresses the problem more explicitly and more directly. Mixing up those concerns
with competition concerns would, in our view, be counterproductive for solving both types
of problems.
129. S. 1812 § 4.
130. Id. § 5.
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and to make the presumption more difficult to rebut. In other words, although
the structural presumption is by no means the only way for the government to
successfully challenge a horizontal merger, it can be used more aggressively
within current law.
More broadly, merger policy is one area where the courts have done a fairly
good job of tracking prevailing economic thinking. This has been facilitated by
the relatively general language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, combined with
the ability of the DOJ and the FTC, with their deep economic expertise and experience and strong links to academia, to incorporate advances in economic
learning into their submissions to the courts. As a leading example of the ﬂexibility of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, both the rise and subsequent decline of
structuralism in merger enforcement were accomplished without signiﬁcant reliance on statutory amendment.131
Section 7 also has proven quite able to accommodate “unilateral effects” theories, as they have developed over the past twenty-ﬁve years. Further, the courts
have moved away from a regime in which efficiencies were either irrelevant or
mergers were condemned because they would make the merged ﬁrm a stronger
competitor, to one that contemplates an efficiency “defense.” Likewise, the courts
both recognized and then later pulled back on various theories of potential competition. In short, the current language of the provision has proven to be remarkably ﬂexible. Given that the concerns of merger policy are fundamentally economic, this ﬂexibility is highly beneﬁcial, especially when combined with
guidance from the DOJ and the FTC that allows merging parties to predict how
their proposed merger is likely to be greeted by the antitrust agencies and, if
necessary, by the courts.
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See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT,
1870-1970, at 206-20 (2014).
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